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INTRODUCTION

For over 20 years, online service providers have relied upon an
established body oflaw interpreting Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act ("Section 230" or the "CDA"), which delineates the extent to
which they can or cannot be responsible for the activities of third-party
users. The Court of Appeals broke with decades of case law interpreting the
CDA as a broad immunity for the "traditional editorial functions" of online
service providers, and instead adopted an idiosyncratic "plain language
interpretation" that Section 230 does not protect the "design and operation
of website features." The untenable result is that the CDA now means
something different in Wisconsin than it does everywhere else.
The Computer and Communications Industry Association ("CCIA")
is comprised of companies in the high-technology products and services
sectors-companies that provide a broad range of online services to billions
of people around the world. Although CCIA takes no position on whether
Defendants in this case are protected by Section 230, it is imperative that
this Court reject the Court of Appeals' unprecedented interpretation-and
thereby ensure national uniformity in the application-of this vital federal
statute.
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ARGUMENT

I.

CONGRESS DETERMINED THAT TRADITIONAL ST AND ARDS OF
PUBLISHER AND DISTRIBUTOR LIABILITY SHOULD NOT APPLY ON
THE INTERNET

Section 230 "immunizes providers of interactive computer services
against liability arising from content created by third parties." Jones v.

Dirty World Entm 't Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2014).
Section 230( c)(l) mandates that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
infonnation provided by another information content provider." 47 U.S.C.
§ 230( c)(1 ). Subject to limited exceptions, "[ n Jo cause of action may be
brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is
inconsistent with this section." Id. § 230(e)(3).
"Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of
Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference
in the medium to a minimum." Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
330 (4th Cir. 1997). Congress understood that if online providers were
subject to traditional publisher or distributor liability whenever third-party
infonnation is posted to, or accessible through, their services, they would
be forced to investigate each and every notice of potentially unlawful
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activity. "Although this might be feasible for the traditional print publisher,
the sheer number of postings on interactive computer services would create
an impossible burden in the Internet context." Id. at 333. As the Sixth
Circuit has explained, barring publisher liability against online services
"serves three main purposes. First, it maintains the robust nature of Internet
communication and, accordingly, keeps govermnent interference in the
medium to a minimum .... Second, the immunity provided by§ 230 protects
against the 'heckler's veto' that would chill free speech .... Third, § 230
encourages interactive computer service providers to self-regulate." Jones,
755 F.3d at 407-08 (citations omitted).

II.

SECTION 230 IMMUNIZES ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS FROM
CLAIMS ARISING FROM CONTENT POSTED BY THIRD PARTIES

"Both state and federal courts around the country have generally
interpreted Section 230 immunity broadly, so as to effectuate Congress's
policy choice ... not to deter harmful online speech through the ... route of
imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other
parties' potentially injurious messages[.]" Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of

NY., Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 281,288 (2011) (citations omitted). Countless courts
have interpreted Section 230 to bar "any cause of action that would make
service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user
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of the service." Jones, 755 F.3d at 406-07 (emphasis added; citations
omitted; collecting cases):
[M]any causes of action might be premised on the publication or
speaking of what one might call "information content." A provider of
information services might get sued for violating anti-discrimination
laws, for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and ordinary negligence, for
false light, or even for negligent publication of advertisements that cause
harm to third parties. Thus, what matters is not the name of the cause of
action---defamation versus negligence versus intentional infliction of
emotional distress-what matters is whether the cause of action
inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the "publisher or
speaker" of content provided by another.

Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted).
Under this standard, virtually every court to have interpreted Section
230 has held that it bars "lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable
for its exercise of a publisher' s traditional editorial functions-such as
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content" that they
did not themselves create. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; accord, e.g. , Jones, 755
F.3d at 407 (immunizing a service provider's exercise of "traditional
editorial functions" goes to the "core" of Section 230). 1

1

Far from being "discredited," as Plaintiff claims without any support (Pl. Br. at 39),
Zeran is widely considered to be the "leading case on section 230 immunity." Hassell v.
Bird, 5 Cal. 5th 522, 535 (2018) (quoting Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 41, 46
(2006) ("The Zeran court's views have been broadly accepted, in both federal and state
courts.")); accord, e.g., Courtney v. Vereb , No . 12-655, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87286, at
*8 (E.D. La. June 21 , 2012) (Zeran is "[o]ne of the most important and oft-cited cases on
CDA immunity").
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Ill.

THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED SECTION 230
A.

The Decision Below Misinterprets the CDA as a Narrow
Immunity That Cannot Protect the "Design and
Operation" of a Website

The Court of Appeals in this case broke from this established
consensus. The Court instead engaged in an idiosyncratic-and
unprecedented-interpretation of Section 230, finding only a "narrow
scope of immunity" applied directly to user communications themselves .
Op.~~ 27, 34, 42, 47 & n.5. It refused to apply Section 230 because
Plaintiff does not (in the Court's view) "seek to hold Armslist liable for
publishing another's information content. Instead, the claims seek to hold
Armslist liable for its own alleged actions in designing and operating its
website in ways that caused injuries to Daniel," i.e., by "facilitat[ing] illegal
firearms purchases" between third parties communicating on the site. Id.

~~

3, 19, 51-52 (emphasis added).
That approach has been rejected by every court to have considered
it. As court after com1 has explained, "Section 230( c)(I) is implicated not
only by claims that explicitly point to third party content but also by claims
which, though artfully pleaded to avoid direct reference, implicitly require
recourse to that content to establish liability or implicate a defendant's role,
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broadly defined, in publishing or excluding third party communications."
Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 140, 155-58 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)
(emphasis added) (barring claims that Facebook "contributed to" unlawful
conduct by allowing persons to create accounts and post offensive content
on its service, because "Facebook's role in publishing [third-party] content
is thus an essential causal element of the claims"); see also, e.g., FTC v.
Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1197 (10th Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument
that CDA did not cover a website's "conduct" in facilitating the posting of
confidential telephone information, "rather than for the content of the
information," because ultimately the website "would not have violated the
FTCA had it not 'published' the confidential telephone information");
Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1164-65 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
(rejecting argument that CDA does not bar claims alleging "provision of
material support" to persons inciting violence online, because "[t]his
argument essentially tries to divorce [a third party's] offensive content from
the ability to post such content"); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 420
(5th Cir. 2008) (noting "fallacy" in plaintiffs' argument that "they only seek
to hold MySpace liable for its failure to implement measures that would
have prevented" minors from communicating on the site, because "[t]heir
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allegations are merely another way of claiming that MySpace was liable for
publishing the communications and they speak to MySpace's role as a
publisher of online third-party-generated content").
Accordingly, it is well settled that "decisions as to the 'structure and
operation' of a website ... fall within Section 230(c)(l)'s protection[.]"
Cohen, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 156-57. Courts uniformly hold that the CDA
"address[es] the structure and operation of [a defendant's] website, that is,
[defendant's] decisions about how to treat postings .... Features such as
these, which reflect choices about what content can appear on the website
and in what form, are editorial choices that fall within the purview of
traditional publisher functions." Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12,
16-17, 21 (1st Cir. 2016) (barring claim that defendant structured website to
facilitate unlawful user transactions); see also, e.g., Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd.
v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 256-58 (4th Cir. 2009)
(defendant immunized from claim that "structure and design of its website"
facilitated tortious content); Universal Commc 'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc.,
478 F.3d 413, 418-22 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Lycos's decision not to reduce
misinformation by changing its web site policies was as much an editorial
decision with respect to that misinfonnation as a decision not to delete a

-7-

particular posting."); Dyro.ff'v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., No. l 7-cv05359-LB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194524, at *18-19 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26,
2017) (rejecting plaintiffs attempt to "plead around§ 230(c)(I) immunity
by basing their claims on the website's tools, rather than the website
operator's role as a publisher of the third-party content"); Herrick v.
Grindr, LLC, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579, 588-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) ("Herrick's
claim that Grindr is liable because it failed to incorporate adequate
protections against impersonating or fake accounts is just another way of
asserting that Grindr is liable because it fails to police and remove
impersonating content .... [T]hese features (or the lack of additional
capabilities) are ... exactly the sort of 'editorial choices' that are a function
of being a publisher.") (citations omitted); Gonzalez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at
1166 (barring claim that "functionality" of Y ouTube' s service "enhance[ d]
[third-paiiy's] ability to conduct [unlawful] operations"); Fields v. Twitter,
Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2016) ("Twitter's decisions to
structure and operate itself as a platform ... reflect choices about what
[third-party] content can appear on [Twitter] and in what fonn. Where such
choices form the basis of a plaintiffs claim, section 230(c)(l) applies.")
(citations omitted).

-8-

Here, however, the Court of Appeals tried to divorce the "design and
operation" of Defendants' website from claims based on third-party content
posted on that site, and Plaintiffs echo this mistake in their arguments to
this Court. Their claims only underscore the logical "fallacy" of that
distinction. MySpace, 528 F.3d at 420. Plaintiffs' theory is that an online
platfonn "is liable for designing and operating its website in a way that
encouraged prohibited sales[.]" Op. ,i 35. But, of course, those sales were
only "encouraged" because the website's "features" enabled users to
connect and communicate with one another on the site. Id.

1113, 19. Thus,

Plaintiffs are ultimately seeking to hold a website liable for its role in
facilitating third-party communications. Id. Without those communications,
there could be no claim of liability.
At bottom, then, Plaintiffs' arguments are premised on the notion
that a website can be held liable for the actions of its users where it,
allegedly, did not do enough to stop those users from posting
advertisements that might result in unlawful sales. That theory does exactly
what Section 230 forbids: premise liability on the choices an online service
provider makes about what "information provided by another information
content provider" should or should not appear on its site. Imposing liability
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on such core publisher activity impermissibly treats the service provider as
the "publisher or speaker" of material supplied by its users. Under the
correct interpretation of the statute, Section 230 applies to any claims that
"can be boiled down to the failure of an interactive computer service to edit
or block user-generated content that it believes was tendered for posting
online, as that is the very activity Congress sought to immunize by passing
the section." Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1172 n.32 (9th Cir. 2008).
B.

The Court of Appeals Should Have Applied the "Material
Contribution Test" to Determine Whether Defendants are
"Information Content Providers"

No one suggests that Section 230 immunity is unlimited. "[A]n
interactive computer service that is also an 'information content provider'
of certain content is not immune from liability arising from publication of
that content." Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1197. Accordingly, instead of
discarding Section 230 outright based on a false distinction between a
website's "content" and "design," the Court of Appeals should have
followed established law to determine whether Defendants are themselves
"information content provider[s]" and therefore "responsible, in whole or in
part," for creating or developing illegality. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
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Under the "material contribution" test, "a website helps to develop
unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to section 230, if it
contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct."
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167-68. Importantly, however, a "material

contribution to the alleged illegality of the content does not mean merely
taking action that is necessary to the display of allegedly illegal content.
Rather, it means being responsible for what makes the displayed content
allegedly unlawful." Jones, 755 F.3d at 410. The service must have
contributed to the illegality intentionally, such as in Roommates.com where
the defendant (which had been sued for soliciting discriminatory
information in violation of the Fair Housing Act) deliberately "designed its
system to use allegedly unlawful criteria so as to limit the results of each
search, and to force users to participate in its discriminatory process." 521
F.3d at 1167. By contrast, merely "providing neutral tools to carry out what
may be unlawful or illicit searches does not amount to 'development' for
purposes of the immunity exception." Id. at 1169 (emphasis added); see
also Jones, 755 F.3d at 416.

As another example, in FTC v. Accusearch, the Tenth Circuit held
that "a service provider is 'responsible' for the development of offensive
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content only if it in some way specifically encourages development of what
is offensive about the content." 570 F.3d at 1199. The comi held that the
defendant, which had actively solicited and paid for confidential telephone
records to be posted and sold on its website, was "not 'neutral' with respect
to generating offensive content; on the contrary, its actions were intended to
generate such content." Id. at 1201 (emphasis added).
Courts around the country have applied this framework in a variety
of contexts, including in cases like this one, where defendants allegedly
"knew or should have known" that website "functionalities" might facilitate
unlawful transactions between users. E.g., Dyro.ff, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
194524, at * 19-29 ("Ultimate Software's functionalities are neutral tools
that do not transform Ultimate Software into an 'information content
provider,' even (f the tools were used to .facilitate unlawful activities on the
site. Ultimate Software's policy about anonymity may have allowed illegal

conduct, and the neutral tools .facilitated user communications, but these
website functionalities do not 'create' or 'develop' information, even in
part.") (emphases added; citations omitted).
The "material contribution" test was also applied in a case invoked
by Plaintiff, JS. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC, where it was
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alleged that defendant intentionally designed its website to facilitate
unlawful transactions between users. 359 P.3d 714, 717-18 (Wash. 2015)
("It is important to ascertain whether in fact Backpage designed its posting

rules to induce sex trafficking to determine whether Backpage is subject to
suit under the CDA because 'a website helps to develop unlawful content,
and thus falls within the exception to section 230, if it contributes
materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct."') (quoting
Roommates. com).

While CCIA takes no position on the outcome of the "material
contribution" test when properly applied in this case, the Court of Appeals
departed from established law by ignoring that test and jettisoning any
possible Section 230 protection, simply because (in its view) Plaintiff seeks
to hold Defendants responsible for the "design and operation" of their
website. The Court itself admitted that this idiosyncratic view conflicts with
authority throughout the country. Op. ,i,i 34-36, 48-51.
Indeed, even the cases the Court of Appeals considered "persuasive"
do not support its analysis. Id. ,i,i 45-46. The Court relied heavily upon a
concurring opinion in JS., but ignored the majority's use of the "material

contribution" test. 359 P.3d at 717-18. The Comi also invoked Barnes,
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which found that a defendant's contractual promise to remove content may
waive the CDA safe harbor, but otherwise endorsed a broad immunity
covering "a publisher's traditional editorial functions," such as "reviewing,
editing, and deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from publication
third-party content." 570 F.3d at 1101-02.
Plaintiff, too, cites cases that supposedly embrace a "narrow
construction of the CDA." Pl. 's Br. at 31-34. None of them actually do. The
vast majority featured allegations that defendants themselves created or
actively solicited unlawful content (Bay Pare Plaza Apartments, Congoo,
Opperman, Perkins, Moving & Storage, Stevo Design, LeanSpa,
CYBERsitter, Fraley, A/vi Armani Medical, Anthony, Hy Cite, MCW, Huon,
Backpage JI). Others concerned ordinances or private suits that did not

involve third-party content (Doe v. Internet Brands, StubHub!, Airbnb,
Homeaway.com, Sigler, Maynard, McDonald). None of those cases found

that the "design and operation" of a website falls outside the CDA,
irrespective of whether it "contributes materially" to illegality, or merely
offers "neutral tools" to third pa1iies. On that, the Court of Appeals stands
entirely alone. And its approach is neither compelled by the text of the
statute nor compatible with the enormous body of robust Section 230 case
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law. This Court should bring Wisconsin in line with this long-established
consensus.

CONCLUSION
The decision below broke with two decades of established case law
and threatens to substantially erode the protections that Section 230 affords
to all service providers-not just Defendants. Unless reversed, plaintiffs
with creative lawyers will come to Wisconsin to exploit this loophole and
pursue claims that have consistently been understood as prohibited in every
other state.
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ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Comi is a Motion to Dismiss (Rec.
Doc. 8) filed by Defendant Angie's List, Inc.
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), arguing that
Plaintiff's claims are barred by the 1996
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230
("CDA''). Plaintiff Dr. John C. Courtney opposes
the motion (Rec. Doc. 12). The motion, set for
hearing on May 23, 2012, is before the Court on the

briefs without oral argument. For the following
reasons, the motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND
This case stems from allegedly defamatory
comments which Plaintiff Dr. John Courtney
contends that Defendant Dr. Bartholomew Vereb
made about him on a web page owned by
Defendant Angie's List, Inc. [*2] Angie's List 1
describes itself as "an online c01mnunity for
members to find service companies and health care
professionals in markets across the country.
Members share their experiences about businesses/
professionals from over 500 service categories,
including doctors, carpet cleaners, handymen,
landscapers, and caterers." See Rec. Doc. 8, p. 1.
Angie's List advertises that it certifies its data
before disseminating its reports to the public. It
states on its website: "Before they're posted, all
reviews are checked in order to guard against
providers and companies that try to report on them
or their competitors." 2
Plaintiff alleges that, on June 2, 2009, Dr. Vereb
"intentionally and maliciously, posted false and
defamatory comments" about Dr. Courtney's
professional services. See Plaintiff's Complaint at
iii! IO and 19. According to the complaint, Dr.
Vereb is a licensed physician, practicing psychiatry
in Bradenton, Florida. He is also simultaneously
licensed as a physician in Louisiana with a defined
practice in psychiatry. Plaintiff states that, contrary

1

http://www.angieslist.com.

2

See http://www.angieslist.com/howitworks.aspx.
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to Dr. Vereb's negative comments, Dr. Courtney
had never 1*3] met nor treated Dr. Vereb or
anyone in Dr. Vereb's family.
Plaintiff purportedly became aware of the negative
postings in "late December of 2011." & at ~ 8.
According to Plaintiff, he immediately contacted
Angie's List via its online internal complaint form
to request that it not disseminate Dr. Vereb's
comments; however, Plaintiff received no response
from Angie's List. Dr. Com1ney alleges that he
repeatedly advised Angie's List that the contents of
the report were false and requested their removal
over the course of several months. Plaintiff asserts
that Angie's List eventually responded and
recommended that Dr. Courtney post a response to
Dr. Vereb's comments, which he did. Plaintiff
continued to request the removal of the comments,
however.
Plaintiff states that, on Febmary 8, 2012, he
received an e-mail from an Angie's List
representative stating that Angie's List had removed
Dr. Vereb's comments because it had discovered
that Dr. Vereb operates in the same field as Dr.
Courtney and Angie's List does not allow
businesses to report on themselves or competitors.
Dr. Courtney subsequently filed suit against both
Angie's List and Dr. Vereb in federal court. It is
undisputed that 1*4] this Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over the instant matter pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332 in that the claims asserted are against
defendants with citizenship other than that of the
plaintiff and because the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000.000, exclusive of interests and
costs.
Plaintiff's stated cause of action against Angie's List
is that Angie's List, as "marketer, publisher,
distributor and/or seller" of the information posted
online, "owed a duty to the Plaintiff to certify its
data and to verify the contents of any negative
posting that purports to be factual statements." Id.
at ~ii 28-29. Dr. Courtney alleges that Angie's List
was negligent in failing to verify the truth of Dr.
Vereb's reviews, which is "contrary to their own

stated policy of certifying data." Id. at ii 31.
According to Dr. Courtney, "Angie's List's
publication of the defamatory comments to third
parties was malicious since it knew or should have
known that the comments were false." Id. at ~ 34.
Dr. Courtney has requested a trial by jury, and
seeks compensatory damages for past and future
mental pain and suffering, past and future economic
loss, past and future loss of earning capacity, as
well as all [*SJ general, special, incidental and
consequential damages as may be proven at the
time oftrial. Id. at~ 35.
Angie's List brings this Motion to Dismiss (Rec.
Doc. 8) based on the argument that Plaintiff's
claims against it are precluded by the 1996
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §230
("CDA"). Having considered the record, the
memoranda of counsel and the law, the Court has
detennined that dismissal is appropriate for the
following reasons.

11. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) authorizes a dismissal of a
complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted." A 12(b)( 6) motion should be
granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his
claim that would entitle him to relief. See Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed.
2d 80 ( 1957). Before dismissal is granted, the court
must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view
them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
apita l Parks. Inc. v. Southeastern Advertising and
Sales Sys., Inc., 30 F.3d 627, 629 (5th Cir. 1994). A
court need not, however, accept as true allegations
that are conclusory in nature. Kai er Aluminum &
Cb m Sa le , Inc. v. AvondaJe Shipyards, Inc., 677
F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).

III. [*6] LAW & ANALYSIS

A. Th l'urpos and History of the CDA
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To determine if Angie's List is immune from the
claims brought against it by Plaintiff based on the
provisions of the CDA, it is helpful to understand
the rationale for the statute. By passing the CDA,
Congress recognized the ever increasing role that
the internet plays in worldwide communication.
See Smith v. Intercosmos Media ,roup, Jn ., 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24251, 2002 WL 31844907 at *2
(E.D.La., Dec. 17, 2002). Congress pointed to "the
availability of educational and informational
resources to our citizens" that the internet provides.
Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230). It also hailed the
internet as "a forum for a true diversity of political
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual
activity" &
Congress saw the burgeoning internet as a benefit
to all Americans. It also recognized that one reason
the internet played such a beneficial role in
American society was that the internet flourished
"with a minimum of government regulation." Id.
With the CDA, Congress made it an official policy
of the United States "to promote the continued
development of the internet and other interactive
media, unfettered by federal
I*7] or state
regulation." Id. Clearly, the purpose of the CDA is
to promote the free flow of information on the
internet.
To ensure that web site operators and other
interactive computer services would not be crippled
ansmg
out
of
third-party
by
lawsuits
communications, the Act provides interactive
computer services with immunity. Doe v.
MySpace, Inc., 474 F.Supp.2d 843, 847 (W.D .Tex.
2007) (citing Dimeo v. Max , 433 F.Supp.2d 523,
528 (E.D.Pa. 2006) (internal citations and
quotations omitted)). Congress provided immunity
to "interactive computer service" providers for
statements
created
by
third
parties
but
disseminated, and thus, published, by internet
services. Unlike newspapers, radio stations, and
other traditional media, under the CDA , websites
may not be held liable for defamatory statements
posted or sent through their services. R. L. Lael ner.

Inc. v. Sanchez, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4038 8,
2005 WL 3359356 at *2 (S.D.Tex., Dec. 9,
2005)(citing Blumenthal v. Drud ge, 992 F.Supp.
44, 49 (D.D.C.1998)). However, individuals who
create defamatory statements may be held liable
even if the offending comments are published by
posting on the internet. Id .
The CDA defines an "interactive computer service"
as "any infonnation f*8] service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables
computer access by multiple users to a computer
server, including specifically a service or system
that provides access to the Internet." 47 U.S.C. §
230(£)(2). The statute identifies an "infonnation
content provider" as "any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the
Internet or any other interactive computer service."
47 U.S.C. § 230(£)(3). The CDA inununizes
providers and users of "interactive computer
services" from liability for the information
provided by a third party "information content
provider." 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(l).
One of the most important and oft-cited cases on
CDA immunity to date is Zeran v. Ame1ica Online,
Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). In Zeran, the
victim of a vicious prank sued America Online, Inc.
("AOL") for failing to remove a false advertisement
offering t-shirts featuring tasteless slogans related
to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and
instructing interested buyers to call the plaintiff to
place an order. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329. After
receiving death threats from people who were
outraged by the ad, Zeran [*9] learned of the prank
and demanded that AOL remove the ad from its
bulletin board and post a retraction. Id. AOL failed
to remove the original ad, and the unidentified
poster also posted several more ads listing the
plaintiff's phone number. Id. A local radio station
learned of the ads and encouraged its listeners to
'
harass Zeran . Id. The volume and intensity of the
threats became so severe that local police guarded
Zeran's home to protect his safety. Id.
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Zeran sued AOL for negligence because it failed to
remove the ad after specific notice of its falsity and
allowed the third party to post additional ads after
Zeran had put AOL on notice of his harassment and
bodily danger. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the claims on the pleadings, explaining
that the CDA necessarily protects interactive
computer services from liability even after they are
notified of an allegedly defamatory or threatening
post because the insupportable legal burden
imposed by potential t011 liability would undermine
the CDA's goal of promoting speech on the
Internet. Id. at 330. The Court explained that "[b ]y
its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity
to any cause of action that would make
[*10] service providers liable for infonnation
originating with a third-party user of the service."
Id. In enacting the CDA, "Congress made a policy
choice ... not to deter hannful online speech
through the separate route of imposing tort liability
on companies that serve as intermediaries for other
parties' potentially injurious messages." Id. at 33031.
Three other federal courts of appeals have also held
that the CDA immunizes computer service
providers from liability for information that
originates with third parties. Doe v. Bates, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93348, 2006 WL 3813758 at *12
(E.D.Tex., Dec. 27, 2006)(citing Carafano v.
Metro ·pla b.com Jnc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th
Cir. 2003)(noting that the Ninth Circuit in Batzel v.
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) had "joined
the consensus developing across other courts of
appeals that § 230( c) provides broad immunity for
publishing content provided primarily by third
parties"); reen v. Ame1ica Onl.ine, 318 F.3d 465,
4 71 (3d Cir. 2003)(upholding immunity for the
transmission of defamatory messages and a
program designed to disrupt the recipient's
computer); Ben Ezra. Weinstein, & C . v. America
Online, Inc ., 206 F.3d 980, 985-86 (10th Cir.
2000)(upholding immunity 1*11] for the on-line
provision of stock infonnation even though AOL
communicated frequently with the stock quote
providers and had occasionally deleted stock

symbols and other information from its database in
an effort to correct errors)).
B. Defendant May Claim Immunity Under the
CDA
The CDA states that "[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any infonnation provided
by another information content provider." 4 7
U.S.C. § 230(c)(l). In Smith v. Intercosmos M edia
Group, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24251, 2002
WL 31844907 (E.D.La., Dec. 17, 2002), a com1 of
this district employed a three-part test to determine
whether a defendant could properly claim immunity
under the CDA. Judge Berrigan held that, for
purposes of CDA immunity: 1) the party claiming
the immunity must be a provider or user of an
interactive computer service; 2) the alleged
defamatory statement must be made by a third
party; 3) the defamation claim the party seeks
immunity from must treat the interactive computer
service as the publisher or speaker of the alleged
defamatory statement. Smith, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24251, 2002 WL 31844907 at *2.
Here, Plaintiff seeks to impose tort liability on a
company that functions [*12] as an intennediary
by providing a forum for the exchange of
information between third party users. See Doe v.
Myspace, 474 F.Supp. 2d at 848. In his opposition,
Plaintiff contends that Angie's List cannot be
granted immunity under the CDA because it is not
merely just an "interactive computer service," but
also provides copies of posted reviews to
consumers upon request by telephone and fax.
According to Plaintiff, Angie's List also operates as
an "infonnation content provider" because it
requests that individuals, as part of their report
generation process, respond to standard queries and
provide additional content about the professional
against whom they are reporting. In applying the
three-part test to the facts of the instant case, the
Court finds that Defendant Angie's List is entitled
to CDA immunity for the following reasons.
1. Angie's Listi an lnteractive
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As stated supra, the CDA defines an interactive
computer service as "any information service,
system, or access software that provides access to
the internet and such systems operated or services
offered by libraries or educational institutions." 4 7
U.S.C. § 230(£)(2). The term "interactive computer
service" 1*13] differs from "information content
provider," which means "any person or entity that
is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation
or development of information provided through
the Internet or any other interactive computer
service." 47 U.S.C. § 230(£)(3). " Defendant
Angie's List argues that it qualifies as an
"interactive computer service" and thus meets the
first prong of the test.

concerning Plaintiff onto a national website to be
viewed by all." Plaintiff Complaint, ~ii 10, 19.
However, Plaintiff also argues that Angie's List
operates as an information content provider.
Plaintiff asserts that "through its services, Angie's
List requests that individuals, as part of their report
generation process, provide additional content
about the professional against whom they are
report," and that they are therefore responsible for
the allegedly defamatory content of Dr. Vereb's
postings. Plaintiff Opposition, p. 7. Therefore,
although Plaintiff admits that Angie's List is not
solely responsible [*15) for creating the content
complained of, Plaintiff argues that Angie's List is
responsible, in part, for the "development of the
content provided." Id.

Plaintiff does not dispute that Angie's List offers an
interactive exchange of information, but points out
that members may be provided information on a However, Plaintiff fails to provide, and the Court
service provider by phone or.fax, as well as via the has been unable to locate, binding case law
internet. According to Plaintiff, because Angie's establishing that a website's use of a questionnaire
List offers infonnation by means other than online, renders it a "content provider" of infonnation
it cannot claim the immunity protection of the CDA provided in response to same. The allegedly
afforded to traditional interactive computer defamatory statements objected to by Plaintiff were
services. This argument is creative, but unsupported admittedly authored by Defendant Dr. Vereb; the
by the case law; Plaintiff did not provide, and the Court finds no authority for Plaintiffs argument
Court has been unable to locate, cases in which a that Defendant Angie's List can be held liable for
website which offers users the option of receiving these statements in spite of the protective
hard copies of online information via telephone or provisions of the CDA.
fax was deemed to be "not merely just an 3. The Complaint Treats the Defendant as the
'interactive computer service."' See Rec. Doc. 12, p. Pub lisher of tJ1e Alleged Defamatory Statements
5. The Court finds that excluding websites which
1*14] offer this type of additional service from the For CDA immunity from state and federal claims,
protection of the CDA would be contrary to the the defendant must be treated as the publisher of
policy behind the statute, which was "to promote the alleged defamatory statements. Plaintiffs
the continued development of the internet" by complaint specifically alleges that Angie's List is
allowing it to expand "unfettered by federal or state the "publisher...of infonnation to the general public
searching for qualified medical services." Plaintiff
regulation." 47 U.S.C. § 230.
Complaint ~ 28. Therefore, the third part of the test
2. Statements Were Made by a Third Party
is satisfied.
Plaintiff readily admits that the allegedly
defamatory statements were made by a third party,
Defendant Dr. Vereb. Plaintiffs complaint states
that the subject comments were "posted by Dr.
Vereb," and that "Dr. Vereb intentionally and
maliciously posted false and defamatory comments

IV. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Defendant Angie's List meets
the three requirements [*16] for asse1ting CDA
immunity against the claims brought against it by
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Plaintiff. First, the defendant qualifies as an
interactive service provider. Second, the defendant
is not the source of the alleged defamatory
statements. Third, the claim against the defendant
treats the defendant as publisher of the alleged
defamatory statements.
Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss
(Rec. Doc. 8) filed by Defendant Angie's List, Inc.
is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims against
Angie's List are dismissed with prejudice.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 21st day of June,
2012.

Isl Jay C. Zainey
JAY C. ZAINEY
UNITED STATES DISTRJCT JUDGE

End of Oocumcut
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Reporter
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194524 *; 2017 WL 5665670

KRISTANALEA DYROFF, Plaintiff, v. THE
ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP, INC.,
Defendant.
Counsel: [*1] For Kristanalea Dyroff, individually
and on behalf of the estate of Wesley Greer,
deceased, Plaintiff: Sin-Ting Mary Liu, LEAD
ATTORNEY, Aylstock Witkin Kreis & Overholtz
PLLC, Alameda, CA; David F. Slade, PRO HAC
VICE, Carney Bates & Pulliam, PLLC, Little Rock,
AR.

For The Ultimate Software Group, Inc., Defendant:
David Eugene Russo, Shawn Adrian Toliver,
LEAD ATTORNEYS, Justin S. Kim, Lewis
Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, San Francisco,
CA; John Joseph Moura, LEAD ATTORNEY,
Gilbert Kelly Crowley & Jennett LLP, Los
Angeles, CA.
Judges: LAUREL BEELER, United States
Magistrate Judge.

died from an overdose of heroin laced with
fentanyl. 1 Mr. Greer allegedly bought the drug from
a drug dealer that he met online through their
respective posts on Ultimate Software's (now
inactive) social-network website "Experience
Project." Ms. Dyroff asserts seven state claims: (1)
Negligence, (2) Wrongful Death, (3) Premises
Liability, (4) Failure to Warn, (5) Civil Conspiracy,
(6) Unjust Enrichment, [*2] and (7) a violation of
the Drug Dealer Liability Act (Cal. Health & Safety
Code §§ 11700, et seq.). 2 She predicates Ultimate
Software's liability on its mining data from its
users' posts and using its proprietary algorithms to
understand
the
posts
and
to
make
recommendations, which in this case steered Mr.
Greer toward heroin-related discussion groups and
the drug dealer who ultimately sold him the
fentanyl-laced heroin. 3 Ultimate Software removed
the action from state court based on diversity
jurisdiction4 and moved to dismiss all claims under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).s
For all claims except claim four, Ultimate Software
asserts immunity under the Communications
Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(l). 6 Section
230(c)(l) provides immunity to website operators
for third-party content on their website unless they

Opinion by: LAUREL BEELER

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: ECF No. 13

1
Comp!.- ECF No. 1-1 at 5 (~ 8), 19 (ii 44). Record citations refer
to material in the Electronic Case File ("ECF"); pinpoint citations are
to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents.

2 Id.

INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff Kristanalea Dyroff, individually and
on behalf of her son's estate, sued Ultimate
Software after her son, 29-year-old Wesley Greer,

at 26-3 7

(~ii 72-126).

3

Opposition to Motion to Dismiss -

4

Notice of Removal -

5 Motion
6 1d.
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ECF No. 15 at 12.

ECF No. I at 1-3.
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Page 2 of 17
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194524, *2

are responsible, in whole or in pmi, for the creation
or development of content. Id. §§ 230(c)(l) &
(f)(3). The court dismisses the claim because
Ultimate Software is immune under§ 230(c)(l). Its
"[ content]-neutral tools" facilitated communication
but did not create or develop it. Fair Hous. Council
of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC,
521 F.3d 1157, 1167-69 (9th Cir. 2008) (en bane).

anonymously share their first-person "experiences"
with other users. 10 Experience Project's founder
stated, "We don't want to know [a user's] real name,
their phone number, what town they're from." "The
impetus behind this policy [of anonymity] was to
encourage users to share experiences with the least
amount of inhibition possible. The greater the
anonymity, the more 'honest' the post . ... " 11

For claim four (negligent failure to warn), Ultimate Thus, Experience Project allowed users to register
Software asserts that a website has no duty to warn on the site with anonymous user names and
its users of criminal activity by other users and that thereafter join or start groups based on their
Mr. Greer assumed the risk of the obviously experiences [*4] or interests, such as "I like dogs,"
dangerous activity of [*3] buying drugs from an "I have lung cancer," "I'm going to Stanford," or "I
anonymous Internet drug dealer. 7 A duty to warn Love Heroin," and to post and discuss their
can arise from a business's "special relationship" personal experiences and interests to those
with its customers or from its own creation of risk. groups. 12 After a user established an account and
McGarry v. Sax, 158 Cal. App. 4th 983, 995, 70 joined a group, the user could ask questions or
Cal. Rptr. 3d 519 (2008). The court holds that answer questions posed by other members. 13
Ultimate Software had no special relationship with Ultimate Software, using advanced data-mining
Mr. Greer and did not create risk through its algorithms, analyzed the posts and other user data
website functionalities or its interactions with law to glean information, including the underlying
enforcement, and thus it had no duty to warn Mr. intent and emotional state of the users. 14 Ultimate
Greer about another user's criminal activity.
Software used this infonnation both for its own
commercial purposes (such as selling data sets to
The court dismisses all claims without prejudice third parties) and to steer Experience Project users
and with leave to amend.
to other groups on its website through its
proprietary recommendation functionality. 15 It also
***
utilized email and other "push" notifications to alert
users when a new post or response occurred. 16 As
of May 2016, the website had over sixty-seven
STATEMENT 8
million "experiences shared." 17
Experience Project 9 is a (now donnant) socialnetwork site consisting of vanous "online In 2007, when he was a college student, Mr. Greer
communities"
or
"groups"
where
users

°CompI. -

1
7

Id al 18.

11

~ The allegations in the "Statement" are from the plaintiffs
complain!. See Comp!. - ECF No. 1-1.
9

The plaintiff initially named Experience Project and Kanjoya, Inc.
as additional defendants. Comp. - ECF No. 1-1. ln its notice of
rem oval. Ultimate Sotiware explained that it acquired the website
Experience Project from Kanjoya, which now is a wholly owned
subsidiaiy of Ullimatc Software. Notice of Removal - ECF No. l ;
Stipulation - ECF No. 18. The parties then stipulated to dismiss
Experience Project and Kanjoya . Stipulation - ECF No. 18.
Ultimate Software thus is the only defendant.

ECF No. 1-1 at 6 (ii 12). 8 (ii 18).

Id. at 16 (~ 36).

12 Id.

at 3 (~ 2), 8 (ii 18), 20

13

Id. at 9 (~ 2 1).

14

Id. at 3 (~ 2).

15 Id
16

at 3

(ii 2) and 9 (ii 22).

Id at 5 (~ 8), 20

17 Id.
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at 9 (~ 20).

(ii 52), 25-26 (ii 70).
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suffered a knee injury. During his recovery, he was
prescribed opioid painkillers and became addicted,
first to opioids and then to heroin. 18 He began
treatment in 2011, completing five separate rehab
programs, but he relapsed [*5] each time. 19 By
2013, he had completed a faith-based program in
Florida, remained clean, and continued living and
working there. 20 ln January 2015, the program was
unable to hire him, and he left to run a halfway
house . He was concerned that the drug-seeking
environment there endangered his sobriety, and in
February 2015, he moved home to Brunswick,
Georgia, to live with his mother and stepfather and
help them renovate their house. 21
ln August 2015, Mr. Greer conducted a Google
search to find heroin, and he was directed to the
defendant's website "Experience Project." 22 He
created an account with Experience Project,
purchased "tokens" (which enabled him to post
questions to other users), and posted to a group
titled "where can i score heroin in jacksonville,
fl ."23
On August 17, 2015, Experience Project sent an
email to Mr. Greer notifying him that "Someone
posted a new update to the question 'where can i
score heroin in jacksonville, fl,"' and providing a
hyper link and a URL directing him to the update. 24
This update (or a similar one) alerted Mr. Greer that
another Experience Project user, Hugo MargenatCastro, an Orlando-based drug dealer, had
responded to Mr. Greer's post. Mr. Greer [*6] was
able to obtain his phone number through
Experience Project. 25 Mr. Greer called Mr.

IS

Margenat-Castro, and in the early hours of August
18, 2015, drove from Brunswick, Georgia, to
Orlando, Florida, where he bought fentanyl-laced
heroin from Mr. Margenat-Castro. He then returned
to Brunswick. 26 On August 19, 2015, Mr. Greer
died from fentanyl toxicity. 27
In numerous earlier posts on Experience Project,
Mr. Margenat-Castro offered heroin for sale in
groups such as "l love Heroin" and "heroin in
Orlando." He actually sold heroin mixed with
fentanyl ("a fact that he hid in his posts" and
"misrepresented as heroin"). Fentanyl is a synthetic
opioid that is fifty times stronger than heroin. 28
Before Mr. Greer's death, Mr. Margenat-Castro
regularly used Experience Project to sell a mixture
of heroin and fentanyl. Based on his activity on
Experience Project, law-enforcement agencies
conducted "controlled buys" of heroin from Mr.
Margenat-Castro on March 31, 2015, and June 24,
2015, and Mr. Margenat-Castro was arrested on
April 1, 2015, and June 25 , 2015, for possession
with intent to sell fentanyl, among other drugs,
stemming from his sale of drugs on Experience
Project's website. 29 Officers made another [*7]
controlled buy from Mr. Margenat-Castro on
September 3, 2015 . They tied him to his Experience
Project handle "Potheadjuice," confirmed through a
toxicology report that the substance contained
fentanyl, and obtained an an-est warrant on October
7, 2015. 30 ln his March 2017 plea agreement, Mr.
Margenat-Castro estimated that he sold ten bags of
fentanyl-laced heroin every day (seven days a
week) between January 2015 and October 2015 via
Experience Project. He estimated selling roughly

id. at ] 9 (ii 44.)

(ii 45).

2S Jd.

at 20-21 (iliJ 53-55).

lO

id. (~ 46).

26 id.

at 20-21 (ilil 54-55, 57).

l I

Jd. (il,J 4 7-48).

21

id. at 21 (1 57).

lk

id. at 5 (il,17-8). 20 (iJ 54), 22-23 (iJ 61 ).

19 id.

22 id.

2.1

at 20

(ii 49).

id at 20 (1il 49-5 I).

2~ id.

at 20 (~ 52).

29 id.

at 22-23 (~~ 61. 63).

30 Id.

at 24
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1,400 bags of heroin laced with fentanyl.3 1 Ms.
Dyroff contends that by August 17, 2015, when her
son bought the drugs from Mr. Margenat-Castro,
Ultimate Software had actual or constructive
knowledge of Mr. Margenat-Castro's trafficking
fentanyl-laced heroin on Experience Project. 32
Ms. Dyroff alleges that Ultimate Software operated
Experience Project in an unlawful manner that
facilitated extensive drug trafficking between drug
dealers and drug buyers, even providing "reviews"
of drug dealers who trafficked on Experience
Project's website. 33 Specifically, she alleges that
Ultimate Software:
( 1) allowed its Experience Project users to
anonymously traffic in illegal deadly narcotics;
(2) allowed users to create groups [*8]
dedicated to the sale and use of such illegal
narcotics;
(3) steered users to "additional" groups
dedicated to the sale of such narcotics (through
the use of its advanced data-mining algorithms
to manipulate and funnel vulnerable individual
users to hannful drug trafficking groups on
Experience Project's website);
(4) sent users emails and other push
notifications of new posts in those groups
related to the sale of deadly narcotics;
(5) allowed Experience Project users to remain
active account holders despite (a) the users'
open drug trafficking on Experience Project's
website, (b) Ultimate Software's knowledge of
this (including knowledge acquired through its
proprietary data-mining technology, which
allowed it to analyze and understand its users'
drug-trafficking posts) and (c) multiple lawenforcement actions against users related to
their drug dealing on the Experience Project
website;
(6) exhibited general and explicit antipathy

)I

Id. at 21-22 (~ 58), 23-24

towards law enforcement's efforts to curb
illegal activity on Experience Project's
website; 34 and
(7) received numerous information requests,
subpoenas, and warrants from law enforcement
and should have known about drug trafficking
on its site by its users, including [*9] - by the
time of her son's death - Mr. MargenatCastro's sales of fentanyl-laced heroin. 35

***
GOVERNING LAW

A complaint must contain a "short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief' to give the defendant "fair notice"
of what the claims are and the grounds upon which
they rest. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell At!. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167
L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). A complaint does not need
detailed factual allegations, but "a plaintiffs
obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his
'entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a claim for
relief above the speculative level .... " Id. (internal
citations omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual allegations, which when
accepted as true, "'state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 193 7, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868
(2009) (quoting Twomb(v, 550 U.S. at 570). "A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Id. "The plausibility
standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,'
but it asks for more than a sheer [*10] possibility

<ii 64).
)<lei.at 26-27 (~ 73). 3-4 c,1,12-3). 16-17

33

lei. at I 3 (ii 3 I), 25-26 (ii 70), 26-27 (~ 73), 27 (ii 75).

)S

<ii 38).

Id at 4 c,1 5). 17 c,1 39), 24 (~ 65), 25 c,1 70).
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that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). "Where a complaint
pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a
defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement
to relief.""' Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

If a court dismisses a complaint, it generally should
give leave to amend unless "the pleading could not
possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts."
Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection
Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). A
court need not grant leave to amend if the court
detennines that permitting a plaintiff to amend
would be futile. See e.g., Beckman v. Match.com,
LLC, 668 Fed. Appx. 759, 759 (9th Cir. 2016)
(district court did not abuse its discretion when it
detem1ined that amendment of claims [barred by §
230 of the Communications Decency Act] would
be futile) (citing Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d
829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991)); Rutman Wine Co. v. E. &
J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS
The next sections address (1) whether Ultimate
Software has § 230(c)(l) immunity for all claims
except claim four, the failure-to-warn claim, and
(2) whether Ultimate Software had a duty to warn
Mr. Greer that Mr. Margenat-Castro was selling
fentanyl-laced heroin.

1. Section 230(c)(l) Immunity
For all claims except claim four, Ultimate Software
asserts that as a website operator, it is immune from
liability under the Communications Decency Act
("CDA"), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(l). 36 The CDA
provides that website operators [*11] are immune
from liability for third-party "information" (such as
the posts here) unless the website operator "is

Motion to Dismiss -

In the next sections, the court provides an overview
of the CDA and applies the Act to Ms. Dyroff s
claims.

1.1 Overview Of the Communications Decency
Act

***

JI,

responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of the information." Id. §§ 230(c)(l)
& (f)(3). The plaintiff contends that Ultimate
Software developed third-party infonnation (or
content) here by mining data from its users' posts
and using its proprietary algorithms to understand
the posts and to make recommendations, which in
this case steered Mr. Greer toward heroin-related
discussions and the drng dealer who sold him
fentanyl-laced heroin. 37 The court holds that
Ultimate Software is immune under § 230(c)(l).
Only third parties posted content, and without
more, Ultimate Software's providing contentneutral tools to facilitate communication does not
create liability. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d
1157 at 1167-69.

ECF No. 13-1 at 8-15 .

Under the CDA, (I) website operators generally
have immunity from third-party content posted on
their websites, but (2) they are not immune if they
create or develop information, in whole or in part.
47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(l) & (f)(3).

1.1.1 Immunity For Third-Party Content
First, website operators [*12]
generally are
immune from liability from third-party posts. Id.
Under the CDA, "[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another il?formation content provider." 47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(l) (emphasis added). Moreover,
"no [civil] liability may be imposed under any State
or local law that is inconsistent" with § 230( c )(1 ).
id. § 230(e)(3).

Jl

Opposition to Motion to Dismiss -
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The most common "interactive computer services"
are websites. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162
n.6. 38 The CDA defines an "information content
provider" as "any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of infonnation provided through the
Internet or any other interactive computer service."
47 U.S.C. § 230(£)(3).

521 F.3d at 1165. As the Ninth Circuit has
explained, the CDA "does not declare 'a general
immunity from liability deriving from third-party
content."' internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 852 (quoting
Barnes v. Yahoo!, inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th
Cir. 2009)). Nor was it "meant to create a lawless
no-man's land on the Internet." Roommates.com,
521 F.3d at 1164.

In general, then, § 230(c )(1) "protects websites
from liability for material posted on the[ir]
website[s] by someone else." Doe v. internet
Brands, inc., 824 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2016).
More specifically, § 230(c)(l) '"immunizes
providers of interactive computer services against
liability arising from content created by third
parties."' Kimzey v. Yelp! inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1265
(2016) (quoting Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at
1162). Section 230(c) thus "overrides the traditional
treatment of publishers, distributors, and speakers
under statutory and common law." Batzel v. Smith,
333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003). "The
prototypical service qualifying for [CDA]
immunity is an online messaging board (or bulletin
board) on which Internet subscribers post
comments [*13] and respond to comments posted
by others."' Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1266 (quoting FTC
v. Accusearch inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1195 (10th Cir.
2009)).

In Roommates.com, the Ninth Circuit considered
whether Roommates.com created content, found
that it did (at least "in part"), and concluded that it
was not entitled to § 230( c)(1) immunity for the
content that it created. 521 F.3d at 1165.
Roommates.com operated a website that matched
people renting rooms to people looking for a place
to live. id. at 1161. It required subscribers to create
profiles and answer questions - about themselves
and preferences in roommates - regarding criteria
including sex, sexual orientation, and whether they
would bring children to the household. id. at 1161.
The Fair Housing Councils of the San Fernando
Valley and San [*14] Diego sued Roommates.com,
alleging that it violated the federal Fair Housing
Act and California housing-discrimination laws. id.
at 1162. Roommates.com asserted that it had
immunity under§ 230(c)(l).

1.1.2 No Immunity for Websites That Create or
Develop Content
But if a website operator "is responsible, in whole
or in pai1, for the creation or development of
information" on its website, then it is an
"information content provider," and it does not
have immunity from liability for that information.
47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(l) & (f)(3); Roommates.com,

.ix The definition "interactive computer service" is "any information
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables
computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet
and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or
educational institutions." 47 U.S.C. § 230(t)(2).

In its en bane decision, the Ninth Circuit held that
Roommates.com was not immune for eliciting
discriminatory preferences that violated federal and
state fair-housing laws:
By requiring subscribers to provide the
information as a condition of accessing its
service, and by providing a limited set of prepopulated answers, Roommate 39 [became J
much more than a passive transmitter of
infonnation provided by others; it [became] the
developer, at least in part, of that infonnation.
And section 230 provides immunity only if the
interactive computer service does not 'creat[ e]
or develop[]' the information 'in whole or in

39

The op1111on refers to "Roommate" (as opposed to the plural
Roommates, which is the spelling in the case caption and in the
company's name Roommates.com).
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part."'

Id. at 1166 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(£)(3)).
Accordingly, the court held, "the fact that [thirdpa1ty website] users are information content
providers does not preclude [the website itself]
from also being an information content provider by
helping 'develop' at least 'in part' the information"
at issue. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165
(emphasis in the original). This means that
[a] website operator can be both a service
provider and a content provider: If it passively
displays [*15] content that is created entirely
by third parties, then it is only a service
provider with respect to that content. But as to
content that it creates itself, or is 'responsible,
in whole or in part' for creating or developing,
the website is also a content provider."

court held that Roommates.com was "not
responsible, in whole or in part, for the
development of this content, which comes entirely
from subscribers and is passively displayed by
Roommate." Id. at 1174. "Without reviewing every
post, Roommate would have no way to distinguish
unlawful discriminatory preferences from perfectly
legitimate statements." Id. Moreover, there could be
no "doubt that this infonnation was tendered to
Roommate for publication online." Id. "This," the
Ninth Circuit held, "is precisely the kind of
situation for which section 230 was designed to
provide i1mnunity." Id.

As an illustration of the difference between
publishing third-party content (entitling the website
operator to immunity) and developing content
(resulting in no immunity), the Ninth Circuit
distinguished Roommates.corn's search function
Id. at 1162 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(£)(3)). "Thus, from genenc search engines. Id. at 1167.
steered
users
based
on
a website may be immune from liability for some Roommates.com
of the content it displays to the public but be discriminatory criteria, thereby limiting search
subject to liability for other content." Id. at 1162- results and forcing users to participate in its
63. As the court summed up, "[t]he CDA does not discriminatory process. Id. By contrast, generic
grant immunity for inducing third parties to express search engines such as Google, [*17] Yahoo!, and
MSN "do not use unlawful criteria to limit the
illegal preferences. Roommate's own acts posting the questionnaire and requiring answers to scope of the searches[,]. .. [are not] designed to
it - are entirely its doing and thus section 230 of achieve illegal ends [unlike Roommates.corn's
the CDA does not apply to them. Roommate 1s alleged search function, and thus] ... play no part
in the 'development' of any unlawful searches." Id.
entitled to no immunity." Id. at 1165.
at 1167. The court concluded that "providing
By contrast, the court immunized Roommates.com neutral tools to carry out what may be unlawful or
from liability for statements that subscribers illicit [activities] does not amount to 'development'
independently displayed m an "Additional for purposes of the immunity exception." Id. at
Comments" section of their profile. Id. at 1173-74. 1168-69.
Roommates.com
prompted
subscribers
to
"personalize your profile by writing a paragraph or
two describing yourself and what you are looking 1.1.3 Three-Element Test for Immunity Under§
for in a roommate." Id. at 1173. "[S]ubscribers 230(c)(l)
provide[d] a variety of provocative and often very
revealing answers," such as their preferences for
roommates' sex, sexual orientation, and religion. Id.
Roommates.com [*16] published the statements as
written, did not provide guidance about content,
and did not "urge subscribers to input
discriminatory preferences." Id. at 1173-74. The

Separated into its elements, § 230( c)(]) protects
from liability "'(1) a provider or user of an
interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff
seeks to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a
publisher or speaker (3) of infonnation provided by
another information content provider [here, Mr.
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Margenat-Castro]."' Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1268
(quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100-0 I).

1.2 Application Of the Three-Element Test To
Ms. Dyrofrs Claims

1.2.1 ls Ultimate Software a Provider of an
Interactive Computer Service?
The first element is whether Experience Project is
an "interactive computer service." It is undisputed
that it is. 40 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162
(websites are the most common "interactive
computer services").

1.2.2 Does the Plaintiff Seek To Treat Ultimate
Software as a [*18] Publisher?
The second element is whether Ms. Dyroff seeks to
treat Ultimate Software as a speaker or publisher.
Her claims predicate Ultimate Software's liability
on its tools and functionalities. More specifically,
she alleges that Ultimate Software creates or
develops information by mining data from its users'
posts, using its proprietary algorithms to analyze
posts and recommend other user groups, and - in
this case - steering Mr. Greer to heroin-related
discussion groups and (through its emails and push
notifications) to the drug dealer who sold him the
fentanyl-laced heroin.41
The issue here is whether plaintiffs can plead
around§ 230(c)(l) immunity by basing their claims
on the website's tools, rather than the website
operator's role as a publisher of the third-party
content. The Ninth Circuit has held that what
matters is whether the claims "inherently require[]
the court to treat the defendant as the 'publisher or
speaker' of content provided by another." Barnes,
570 F .3d at 1102. If they do, then § 230( c )(I)
precludes liability. Id; accord A irbnb, Inc. v. City
ECF No. 1-1 at 8 (ii 18).

40

See, e.g., Comp!. -

41

Opposition to Motion to Dismiss- ECF No. 15 at 12.

& County of San Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066,
1074 (2016) (citing Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102).
In similar cases, courts have rejected plaintiffs'
attempts to plead around immunity by basing
liability on a website's tools. [*19] See, e.g.,
Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., No. 16-cv-03282-DMR,
282 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
175327, 2017 WL 4773366, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal.
October 23, 2017) (rejecting the plaintiffs'
argument that claims were not based Google's
publishing third-party content from ISIS but instead
were based on Google's "provid[ing] ISIS followers
with access to powerful tools and equipment to
publish their own content"); Fields v. Twitter, 217
F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1121-22 (N.D. Cal. 2016),
appeal docketed, No. 16-17165 (9th Cir. Nov. 25,
2016) (rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that their
claims were not based on Twitter's publishing thirdparty content by ISIS but instead were based on
Twitter's allowing ISIS members to sign up for
Twitter accounts).
The court holds that Ms. Dyroff's claims at their
core seek liability for publishing third-party
content. Element two of the § 230( c )(I) test is
satisfied.

1.2.3 ls the Harmful Content "Third-Party
Content"?
The third element is whether the content is thirdparty content. A third party - Mr. MargenatCastro - posted on Experience Project. The issue
is whether his posts and other allegedly harmful
content are third-party content, which means that §
230( c)(1) bars the claims against Ultimate
Software, or whether Ultimate Software "is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of the infomrntion," which means that
§ 230(c)(l) does not bar the claims. 47 U.S.C. §
230(c)(l) & (f)(3).
Ms. Dyroff contends that the court should [*20]
deem Ultimate Software to have "developed" the
harmful content, at least in paii, for two reasons:
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1.2.3.1 Ultimate Software's Use of Tools to
Develop Content

identifying interested users and usmg its
"recommendation functionality" to steer them to
drug-related "groups" or "online communities,"
Ultimate Software kept the users "engaged on the
site" for Ultimate Software's financial gain (through
online ad revenues, gathering more valuable user
data, and other means). 47 This system - combined
with Experience Project's anonymous registration
and its email-notification functionality that alerted
users when groups received a new post or reply "created an environment where vulnerable addicts
were subjected to a feedback loop of continual
entreaties to connect with drug dealers. "48

Ms. Dyroff contends that a website does not need to
co-author a user's posts to "develop" the content
and thus be responsible for the posts. 43 See 47
U.S.C. § 230(£)(3). She asserts that a website
"develops" content otherwise created by third-party
users (and loses immunity) when it "materially
manipulates that content, including by passively
directing its creation or by improperly using the
content, after the fact. "44 "This manipulation can
take myriad forms, including guiding the content's
generation, either through posting guidelines that
signal or direct the poster, content requirements for
posts, or even post-hoc [*21] use of content that
was generated in whole or in party by a third

The ordinary rule is that Ultimate Software is
immune from liability for third-party content on its
website unless it is [*22] "responsible, in whole or
in part, for the creation or development of
information." 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(l) & (f)(3).
Here, only third parties posted information on
Experience Project, and the website operator did
not solicit unlawful infonnation or otherwise create
or develop content. Ultimate Software is not an
"infonnation content provider" merely because its
content-neutral tools (such as its algorithms and
push notifications) steer users to unlawful content.
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167. The following
points support this conclusion.

(1) its tools, design, and functionality abetted the
content, at least in part, by recommending heroinrelated discussions and steering Mr. Greer to Mr.
Margenat-Castro's posts; and (2) Ultimate Software
is not merely a passive conduit for its users' posts
because it knew that Experience Project was an
online market for dmg dealers and users, and it
shielded the bad actors through its anonymity
policies and antipathy to law enforcement. 42

party."45

Her specific allegations about Ultimate Software's
development of information are as follows.
Ultimate Software used "data mining" techniques
and "machine learning" algorithms and tools to
collect, analyze, and "learn[ ] the meaning and
intent behind posts" in order to "recommend" and
"steer" vulnerable users, like her son, to forums
frequented by drug users and dealers. 46 By

First, making recommendations to website users
and alerting them to posts are ordinary, neutral
functions of social-network websites. To support
her contrary contention that Ultimate Software's
functionalities create or develop information, Ms.
Dyroff relies on Roommates.com and Anthony v.
Yahoo! Inc., but she does not allege any facts
comparable to the facts in those cases. 49
28)), 18-19 (citing Comp I. - ECF No. 1-1 at 5 <ii~ 7-8). 11-19 <iii!
26-42), 20 ci1~ 52-53 l, 25-26 ci1i1 10- 11

n.

42 id.
43

at 13-23.

47

id. at 7, 17-19; Comp!. - ECF No. 1-1 at 3 (ii 2), 4-5 (ii~ 6-8), 912 c~i1 22-23, 25, 21-29), 18-19 ci1 42), 22 <ii 59), 25-26 c~i1 10- 11 l,
21 c~ 75), 30 c~ 9o), 32 cil 96), 34 <i1101), 35 ci1114). 36 <i1116).

id. at 17.

44 id.

at 13 (citing Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168).

4s id.

(citations omitted).

48

id. at l O ( citing Comp I. - ECF No. 1-1 at 11-16 (iii! 26-35).

49

46idat 7, 9-10 (citing Comp!.- ECF No. 1-1 at 9-12 <i!il 22-23, 27-

id. at 13-16 (citing Roommates.com. 521 F.3d at 1161-62. 1165.
1167-68, andA11tho11y ,,. Yahoo! inc .. 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262-63
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In Roommates.com, the website operator created a
questionnaire, provided a limited set of prepopulated (and unlawful) answers as a condition of
accessing the website and its services, and steered
users based on the pre-populated answers. 521 F .3d
at 1166-67. By these acts, Roommates.com
"[became] much more than a passive transmitter of
infonnation provided 1*23) by others; it [became]
the developer, at least in part, of that information.
And section 230 provides immunity only if the
interactive computer service does not 'creat[ e] or
develop[]' the information 'in whole or in part."' Id.
at 1166 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(£)(3)). By
contrast, here, Ultimate Software did not solicit
unlawful content from its third-party users and
merely provided content-neutral social-network
functionalities
recommendations
and
notifications about posts. "Providing neutral tools
for navigating websites is fully protected by CDA
immunity, absent substantial affirmative conduct on
the part of the website creator promoting the use of
such tools for unlawful purposes." Id. at 1174 n.37;
accord Gonzalez, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175327,
2017 WL 4773366, at *11 (rejecting claim that
Google was liable because Y ouTube's website
"functionality" purpmiedly facilitated ISIS's
communication of its message, which resulted in
great harm); Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp.
3d 140, 158 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2017) (rejecting
claim that Facebook provided a tool to support
terrorist organizations); Fields, 217 F. Supp. 3d at
1120-23 (rejecting claim that Twitter provided ISIS
with material support by permitting it to sign up for
accounts). Ms. Dyroff does not plausibly allege that
Ultimate Software "promoted the use of [its
neutral]
tools
for
unlawful
purposes."
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174 n.37.
Ms. Dyroff relies on Anthony v.
Yahoo /*24/ !, but does not allege facts comparable
to those in that case. Yahoo! allegedly created fake
user profiles and sent them - along with actual
user profiles of former subscribers - to current
website users to try to persuade them to renew their
Similarly,

lapsed subscriptions to Yahoo's online dating
service. 421 F. Supp. 2d at 1262. Assuming the
allegations to be true for its Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry,
the court held that Yahoo! was not immune under §
230(c)(l) for two reasons. Id. First, Yahoo! created
content in the form of the false profiles and thus
was an "infonnation content provider." Id. at 126263. Second, with actual knowledge of the false
profiles - including those of former users Yahoo! used the content to (allegedly) commit
fraud and thus was responsible for its
misrepresentations. Id. (collecting cases on §
230(c)(l) immunity). By contrast, here, Ultimate
Software did not create or use unlawful content and
merely provided its neutral social-network
functionalities.
Second, it is the users' voluntary inputs that create
the content on Experience Project, not Ultimate
Software's proprietary algorithms. See, e.g.,
Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1268-70 (Yelp!'s "star-rating
system is best characterized as the kind of 'neutral
tool[]' operating on 'voluntary inputs' that we
determined that does not f*25) amount to content
development or creation in Roommates.com, 521
F.3d at 1172."). Moreover, even if a tool
"'facilitates the expression of [harmful or unlawful]
infonnation,"' it is considered neutral "so long as
users ultimately determine what content to post,
such that the tool merely provides 'a framework
that could be utilized for proper or improper
purposes."' Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp.
2d 1193, 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (rejecting claim
that Google's "Keyword Tool" - which provides
options that advertisers can adopt or reject at their
discretion created liability for subsequent
postings by the adve1iisers of false or misleading
advertisements) ( citing Roommates.com, 521 F .3d
at 1172); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1121, 1124; see
also Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1358,
410 U.S. App. D.C. 187 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("a
website does not create or develop content when it
merely provides a neutral means by which third
parties can post information of their own
independent choosing online").

(N.D. Cnl. 2006)).
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Third, the result holds even when a website collects
information about users and classifies user
characteristics. The website is immune, and not an
"information content provider," as Jong as users
generate all content. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1121,
1124 (online dating site used questionnaires to
collect information about members; "the fact that
[the site] classifies user characteristics into discrete
categories and collects responses to specific essay
questions does [*26] not transform the [site] into a
'developer' of the 'underlying misinformation."').
The court follows these cases and holds that the
Experience Project website's alleged functionalities
including its user anonymity, algorithmic
recommendations of related groups, and the "push"
e-mail notification of posts and responses - are
content-neutral tools. Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at
1168-69. They do not make Ultimate Software an
"infonnation content provider" that "is responsible,
in whole or in pai1, for the creation or development
of information provided through the Internet or any
other interactive computer service," even if the
tools were used to facilitate unlawful activities on
the
site.
See
47
U.S.C.
§
230(£)(3);
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174 n.37; Carafano,
339 F.3d at 1123. In sum, Ultimate Software is
immune under § 230( c)(I) as a publisher of content
created entirely by third-party users.

1.2.3.2 Online Market For Drug Trafficking and
Shielding Bad Actors
Ms. Dyroff contends Ultimate Software knew or
should have known that users sold drugs on
Experience Project, and it shielded bad actors from
the consequences of the drug dealing through its
anonymity policies and antipathy to lawenforcement requests. 50 The idea is that Ultimate
Software is less Match.com and more Silk Road (a
notorious online platform for [*27] criminal
activities, including selling illegal drugs). As
evidence of Ultimate Software's intent to shield bad

50

Id at 18: see also Comp!. ~- ECF No. 1-1 at 17-19 (ii~ 39-42).

actors from law-enforcement efforts, the complaint
cites Ultimate Software's March 2016 public
statement discussing its reasons for suspending the
Experience Project website.
From day one, the privacy of our users has
been paramount and we have never allowed
names, phone numbers, or addresses. This
approach bucked every trend, and challenged
our ability to build an advertising-based
business, but we passionately believe it
provided the foundation for some of the most
meaningful relationships imaginable . . . But
there is no denying that the way people expect
to use social media today is markedly different
... and as the primary use has moved from web
to mobile, our hallmark attributes like longform stories are not aligned.
But, there are deeper, and more troubling
trends than formats. Online anonymity, a core
part of EP, is being challenged like never
before. Governments and their agencies are
aggressively attacking the foundations of
internet privacy with a deluge of information
requests, subpoenas, and warrants. We, of
course, always support proper law enforcement
efforts, [*28]
but
the
well-documented
potential for even abuse, even if unintentional,
is enormous and growing. 51
The complaint's allegations do not establish a
theory of liability. The statement manifests a
concern with Internet privacy that has been
widespread in the technology sector and does not
establish antipathy to law enforcement, especially
given the statement about suppo11ing "proper law
enforcement requests."
Moreover, as the analysis in the last section
establishes, Ultimate Software's functionalities are
neutral tools that do not transform Ultimate
Software into an "information content provider,"
even if the tools were used to facilitate unlawful
activities on the site. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3);

51

Comp!.- ECF No. I-I at 17-18
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Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174 n.37; Barnes,
570 F.3d at 1103; Gonzalez, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
175327, 2017 WL 4 773366, at * 10. Ultimate
Software's policy about anonymity may have
allowed illegal conduct, and the neutral tools
facilitated user communications, but these website
functionalities do not "create" or "develop"
information, even in part. 47 U.S.C. § 230(£)(3);
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174 n.37; Carafano,
339 F.3d at 1123. And they do not show that
Ultimate Software engaged in "substantial
affirmative conduct ... promoting the use of [the]
tools for unlawful purposes." Roommates.com, 521
F.3d at 1167-68, 1174 n.37. Liability requires more
than "neutral tools." Id
As the Ninth Circuit concluded in Roommates.com:
II

Websites are complicated enterprises, [*29]
and there will always be close cases where a
clever lawyer could argue that something the
website operator did encouraged the illegality.
Such close cases, we believe, must be resolved
in favor of immunity, lest we cut the heart out
of section 230 by forcing websites to ... fight[]
off claims that they promoted or encouraged or at least tacitly assented to - the illegality of
third parties. Where it is very clear that the
website directly participates in developing the
alleged illegality ... [,] immunity will be lost.
But in cases of enhancement by implication or
development by inference... [,] section 230
must be interpreted to protect websites not
merely from ultimate liability, but from having
to fight costly and protracted legal battles.
521 F.3dat 1174-75 .

Software had a duty to warn Mr. Greer that Mr.
Margenat-Castro was selling fentanyl-laced heroin
via the Experience Project website. 52 Ultimate
Software moves to dismiss the claim on the
grounds that (I) it had no "special relationship"
with Mr. Greer or created any risks that gave rise to
a duty [*30] to warn him, and (2) Mr. Greer
assumed the risk of buying drugs from an
anonymous Internet drug dealer. 53 The CDA does
not preclude a failure-to-warn claim. Internet
Brands, 824 F.3d at 849-54.
The next sections address (I) whether Ultimate
Software had a "special relationship" with Mr.
Greer that gave rise to a duty to warn, (2) whether
Ultimate Software created a risk that gave rise to a
duty to warn, and (3) whether the assumption-ofrisk doctrine bars recovery.

2.1 Duty to Warn: Special Relationship Nonfeasance (Failure to Act)
The first issue is whether Ultimate Software had a
duty to warn Mr. Greer that Mr. Margenat-Castro
was selling fentanyl-laced heroin because - like
any brick-and-mortar business - it had a "special
relationship" with him that created that duty.
The California Supreme Court has not addressed
whether a website has a special relationship with its
users that gives rise to a duty to warn them of
dangers. The court's task thus is to "predict how the
state high comi would resolve" the issue. Giles v.
GMAC, 494 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2007)
(quotation omitted). For guidance, the court looks
to decisions in the state's intermediate appellate
courts and other jurisdictions. Id

Because Ultimate Software IS Immune under § The elements of a negligence claim are ( 1) the
230( c )(I), the court dismisses all claims except existence of a duty to [*31] exercise due care, (2)
breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages.
claim four.
Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 465, 110 Cal.
2. Count Four: Failure to Warn

52

In claim four, Ms. Dyroff contends that Ultimate

Motion to Dismiss 16 at 18-20.

5.1

Jd.
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Rptr. 2d 370, 28 P.3d I 16, 139 (Cal. 2001). A duty
to exercise due care is an "obligation to conform to
a certain standard of conduct for the protection of
others against unreasonable risks." Mc Garry v. Sax,
158 Cal. App. 4th 983, 994, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 519
(2008) (quotation omitted).

between misfeasance and nonfeasance, and its
reluctance to impose liability for the latter." Zelig,
45 P.3d at 1183 ( quotation omitted). Nonfeasance
is a failure to act. Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15
Cal. 3d 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36, 41
(Cal. 1975). "Misfeasance exists when the
defendant is responsible for making the plaintiff's
"'The existence of a legal duty to use reasonable position worse, i.e., defendant has created a risk."
care in a particular factual situation is a question of Id. With misfeasance, the question of duty is
Jaw for the court to decide."' McGarry, 158 Cal. governed by the ordinary-care standard for
App. 4th at 994 (quoting Adams v. City ofFremont, negligence. Lugtu v. Cal(fornia Highway Patrol, 26
68 Cal. App. 4th 243, 265, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 196 Cal. 4th 703, 716, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528, 28 P.3d
(1998)); Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 249 (2001).
3d 741, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728, 732 (Cal.
1980); Vasquez, 118 Cal. App. 4th 269, 279, 12 In sum, a "special relationship" can create a duty to
Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (2004) (Imposing a duty is "'an act even when one otherwise would not have such a
expression of policy considerations leading to the duty . Zelig, 45 P .3d at 1183 . Ultimate Software
legal conclusion that a plaintiff is entitled to a thus can be responsible for its nonfeasance (its
defendant's protection."') (quoting Ludwig v. City of failure to act) if ( 1) it had a special relationship
San Diego, 65 Cal. App. 4th 1105, 1110, 76 Cal. with a third-party actor and thus had a duty to
Rptr. 2d 809 (1998)); accord Tarasojfv. Regents of control that actor, or (2) it had a special relationship
Univ. of Cal(fornia, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. with Mr. Greer and thus owed him a duty to protect
14, 551 P.2d 334,342 (Cal. 1976) ("legal duties are him. Id. The plaintiff argues that like any business,
not discoverable facts of nature, but merely Ultimate Software has a "special relationship" with
conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular its customers that creates a duty to warn them of
type, liability should be imposed for damage known risks.54
done") .
Courts commonly involve the special-relationship
Under California law, if a person has not created a doctrine "'in cases involving the relationship
proprietors such as
danger, then generally he has no duty to come to between business [*33)
the aid of another person (a victim) absent a [landlords,] shopping centers, restaurants, and bars,
relationship that gives rise to a duty to protect. and their tenants, patrons, or invitees.'" McGany,
Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 4th 1112, 158 Cal. App. 4th at 995 (quoting Delgado v. Trax
119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709, 45 P.3d 1171 , 1182 (Cal. Bar & Grill, 36 Cal. 4th 224, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 145,
2002); accord McGarry, 158 Cal. App. 4th at 995 . 113 P.3d 1159, 1165 (Cal. 2005)). "A business
The "special relationship" can be between the owner may have an affirmative duty to 'control the
person and a third party that imposes a duty to wrongful acts of third persons which threaten
control the third party's conduct. Zelig, 45 P.3d at invitees where the [business owner] has reasonable
I I 83. Or it can be a special relationship between cause to anticipate such acts and the probability of
the person and the foreseeable victim of the third injury resulting therefrom ."' Id. (citing Taylor v.
party's conduct that requires [*32) the person to Cenlennial Bowl, Inc., 65 Cal. 2d 114, 52 Cal. Rptr.
protect the victim. Id.; accord Taraso_ff; 551 P.2d at 561, 416 P.2d 793 (1966)) . "The doctrine also
342.
extends to other types of special relationship[s] ...
including those between common carriers and
The "special relationship" giving rise to a duty to
protect derives "from the common law's distinction
5~

Motion to Dismiss --- ECF No. I 5 at 26.

CCIAApp . 19

Page 14 of 17

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194524. *33

passengers, and mental health professionals and
their patients." id. (quoting Tarasoff; 551 P .2d at
334). These "special relationships generally involve
some kind of dependency or reliance." Olson v.
Children's Home Soc'y, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1362,
1366, 252 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1988); see e.g., Williams v.
State of Cal{fornia, 34 Cal. 3d 18, 192 Cal. Rptr.
233, 664 P.2d 137, 139 (Cal. 1983) (a factor
supporting a special relationship is detrimental
reliance by a person on another person's conduct
that induced a false sense of security and worsened
the position of the person relying on the conduct).

Dist. LEXIS 192144, ECF No. 51 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
14, 2016). The court found no special relationship
and thus no duty to warn. 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
192144 at *11.

Following remand of the internet Brands case, the
district court addressed whether a website has a
"special relationship" with its users that required
the website to warn users of known risks on the
website. See Jane Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands,
inc., No. 2:12-CV-3626-JFW (PJW), 2016 U.S.

LEXIS 35562, 2017 WL 1304288, at *4 (D. Nev.
Mar. I 0, 2017). The plaintiff met and dated a
man 1*36] on Match.com and ended their
relationship eight days later. 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 35562, [WL] at * 1. He then sent her
threatening messages for about four days, and four

The plaintiff was an aspiring model who was a
of
the
networking
website
member
modelmayhem.com. 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
192144 at *5. Two men - who were unaffiliated
with the website used the website to
identify [*35] and lure victims (including the
plaintiff) to Florida, where they drugged and raped
the victims, filming the rapes for distribution as
"'[T]he use of special relationships to create duties pornography videos. 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
has been largely eclipsed by the more modem use 192144 at *3. The plaintiff claimed that by the time
of balancing policy factors enumerated in Rowland she was raped in 2011, Internet Brands knew about
[v. Christian.]"' McGarry, 158 Cal. App. 4th at 996 the two men, had a duty to warn its users, and thus
(quoting Doe I v. City of Murrieta, 102 Cal. App. was liable for its negligent failure to warn her. 2016
4th 899, 918, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213 (2002)) (citing U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192144 at *4.
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr.
97, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968)). The Rowland The case involved nonfeasance, not misfeasance.
factors are the following: "[(1)] the foreseeability of 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192144 at *8 (rejecting as
harm to the plaintiff, [(2)] the degree of certainty unsubstantiated the claim that Internet Brands
that the plaintiff [*34] suffered injury, [(3)] the created the risk). The court found no "special
closeness of the connection between the defendant's relationship" between Internet Brands and the two
conduct and the injury suffered, [(4)] the moral men who carried out the rape scheme, and it thus
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, [(5)] the found that Internet Brands had no duty to control
policy of preventing future harm, [(6)] the extent of their conduct. id. It then addressed whether Internet
the burden to the defendant and consequences to Brands had a "special relationship" with the victimthe community of imposing a duty to exercise care plaintiff, who was a member of the website "along
with resulting liability for breach, and [(7)] the with at least 600,000 others." Id. The court applied
availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the Rowland factors and concluded that there was
the risk involved." id. at 996-97 (quoting Rowland, no special relationship between the website and its
443 P.2d at 564); see also Hansra v. Superior users and thus no duty to warn. 2016 U.S. Dist.
Court,7 Cal App. 4th 630, 646, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216 LEXIS 192144 at *5.
(1992) ("whether a special relationship exists Another district court - again on remand from the
giving rise to a duty to protect . . . [involves] Ninth Circuit - also concluded that a website had
consideration of the same factors underlying any no duty to warn its users. Beckman v. Match.com,
duty of care analysis").
LLC, No. 2:13-CV-97 JCM (NJK), 2017 U.S. Dist.
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months later, attacked her viciously. Id She sued
Match.com for failure to warn her that the website
and her attacker were dangerous, basing her claim
in part on Match.corn's access to data about its
users and use of the data to create matches. 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35562, [WL] at *1-*3. Applying
Nevada law, which is similar to California law, the
court found no special relationship between
Match.com and the plaintiff. 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 35562, [WL] at *3-*4. The plaintiff was
merely a paying subscriber, paid the fee, set up her
profile, and was matched with the attacker. 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35562, [WL] at *3. The court
concluded that the website had no special
relationship with the plaintiff and thus no duty to
warn her. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35562, [WL] at
*4.

have a 'chilling effect' on the [l]nternet by opening
the floodgates of litigation." 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
192144 at * 14 (referencing the briefs in the Ninth
Circuit). Also, the court is not convinced that a
bricks-and-mortar business (such as a bar where
people meet more obviously) is a good analogue to
a social-network website that fosters connections
online. For one, allocating risk is (in part) about
foreseeability of harm and the burdens of allocating
risk to the defendant or the plaintiff. See Rowland,
443 P.2d at 561. Risk can be more apparent in the
real world than in the virtual social-network
world. 56 That seems relevant here, when the claim
is that a social-network f*38] website ought to
perceive risks - through its automatic algorithms
and other inputs -about a drug dealer on its site.

If the court followed this approach, it would render
all social-network websites potentially liable
whenever they connect their members by
algorithm, merely because the member is a
member. This makes no sense practically. Imposing
a duty at best would result in a weak and ineffective
general warning to all users. Internet Brands, No.
2:12-cv-3626-JFW (PJW), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
192144, ECF No. 51 at 6. It also "likely [wou Id]

56 Ms. Dyroff cites eBay, inc v. Bidder's Edge, Inc. to support the
conclusion that a business's liability does not turn on the difference
between a bricks-and-mortar business and an Internet business.
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss - ECF No. 15 at 24-25 (citing I 00
F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2000)). eBay docs not change the
court's conclusion. In eBay. the court granted eBay a preliminary
injunction to prevent a competing auction website from scanning
eBay's website for nuction info1111ation. 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1065. The
cou11 held that the difference between eBay's vi1iual store and a
physical store were "formalistic." and it found the competitor's
actions more like a trespass to real property (as opposed to a trespass
to chattels) because the electronic signals were sufficiently tangible
to equate to a physical presence on eBay's property. Id. at 1067 &
11.16. That result makes sense: there was a threatened physical
incursion onto cBay's website. But it provides no support for
equating bricks-and-mortar businesses (such as bars) to socialnetwork websites.

Moreover, even if Ultimate Software had superior
These cases support the conclusion that a website knowledge about Mr. Margenat-Castro's selling
has no "special relationship" with its users. Ms. fentanyl-laced heroin, that knowledge does not
Dyroff nonetheless contends that websites create a special relationship absent dependency or
operators such as Ultimate Software are the detrimental reliance by its users, including Mr.
"twenty-first century equivalent of a brick and Greer. Internet Brands, No. 2: 12-cv-3626-JFW
mortar business. . . like restaurants, bars, . . . (PJW), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192144, ECF No.
amusement parks, and all businesses open to the 51 at 6 ("it may have been foreseeable that [the two
public" and have the same duty that all businesses men] would strike again"). For example, in Conti v.
open to the public owe their invitees. The duty Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York,
"includ[es] 'tak[ing] affinnative action (*37] to Inc., the California Court of Appeal held that a
control the wrongful acts of third persons which religious organization had no special relationship
threaten invitees where the occupant has reasonable with its congregation and thus had no duty to warn
cause to anticipate such acts and the probability of them - despite its knowledge of the high risk of
injury resulting therefrom. "55

55

Opposition to Motion to Dismiss - ECF No. 15 at 24-26 (quoting
Taylor v, Ce111e1111ial Bowl, Inc., 65 Cal. 2d 114. 52 Cal. Rptr. 561.
416 P.2d 793, 797 (Cal. 1996)).
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recidivism - that a fellow member was a child
molester. Id. (citing Conti, 235 Cal. App. 4th 1214,
186 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 26 (2015), as the case with the
most analogous facts). ln Olson, the California
Court of Appeal held that there was no ongoing
"special relationship" between an adoption agency
and a birth mother who gave up her son for
adoption that required the agency to notify the birth
mother when it learned that the son tested positive
for a [*39) serious inherited disease passed from
mothers to their male offspring. Olson, 204 Cal.
App. 3d at 1366-67. The birth mother later had a
second son with the same affliction. Id. By contrast,
a duty can arise for a defendant with superior
knowledge if there is dependency or reliance. See
Internet Brands, No. 2: 12-cv-3626-JFW (PJW),
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192144, ECF No. 51 at 6
n.3 (citing O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Cmp.,
75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977)). In
O'Hara, the landlord had a duty to warn his tenant,
who was raped, about the risks because he knew of
prior rapes at the apartment complex, knew about
the likelihood of a repeat attack because police
gave him composite drawings of the suspect and a
description of his modus operandi, failed to warn
his tenant, and assured her that the premises were
safe and patrolled at all times by professional
guards). Id. (citing O'Hara, 75 Cal. App. 3d 798,
142 Cal. Rptr. 487). Here, Ms. Dyroff has not
alleged dependency or reliance.

heroin. 57 The court holds that Ultimate Software's
use of the neutral tools and functionalities on its
website did not create a risk of harm that imposes
an ordinary duty of care. See Lugtu, 28 P.3d at 25657 (negligence standard for misfeasance). A
contrary holding would impose liability on a socialnetwork website for using the ordinary tools of
recommendations and alerts. The result does not
change merely because Experience Project
pennitted anonymous users.

2.3 Assumption of Risk

The last issue is whether the assumption-of-risk
doctrine bars Mr. Greer's failure-to-warn claim.
Because the com1 holds that there is no duty to
warn, it does not reach the issue. If it were to reach
the issue, it would likely hold that the doctrine
operates as a complete bar to his claim because Mr.
Greer who initiated the contact with Mr.
Margenat-Castro by his posts on Experience Project
and then bought drugs from him - assumed the
obviously dangerous risk of buying drugs from an
anonymous Internet drug dealer. See, e.g., Souza v.
Squaw Valley Ski Cmp., 138 Cal. App. 4th 262,
266-67, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 389 (2006).
***

CONCLUSION

ln sum, the court holds that there was no special
relationship between Ultimate Software and Mr.
Greer that gave rise to a duty to warn.

2.2 Duty to Warn Risk)

Misfeasance (Creation of

The court giants the motion to dismiss without
prejudice. The plaintiff must file any amended
complaint within 21 days.
This disposes of ECF No. 13.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Ms. Dyroff also contends that Ultimate Software
created a risk of hann through its website
functionalities and thus owed her son an ordinary
duty of care to warn him about Mr. Margenatof fentanyl-laced
Castro's
trafficking [*40]

Dated: 1*41] November 26, 2017

Isl Laurel Beeler
LAUREL BEELER

57

Opposition to Motion to Dismiss·- ECF No. 15 at 26.
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United States Magistrate Judge
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